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I. RISE OF RELIGIOUS ROBOTS
A. THE NO RELIGION CODE
Imagine this.
It is 2045.1 The United States is in its final military campaign against a
dangerous terrorist group hiding in the jungles of Southeast Asia. Because of the
perils associated with smoking out terrorists in unfamiliar territory, the United
States uses a military unit composed entirely of robots. The robots, specifically
designed and manufactured for warfare, are equipped with an advanced level of
artificial intelligence that allows them to learn and adapt quicker than their
human counterparts. The robots are the perfect weapon: precise, lethal, and
expendable.
1. See Jamie Carter, When Will Singularity Happen—and Will It Turn Earth Into Heaven or Hell?,
TECHRADAR (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.techradar.com/us/news/world-of-tech/when-will-singularity-
happen-and-will-it-turn-earth-into-heaven-or-hell–1287624 [https://perma.cc/A8BF-MWK5].
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However, on the eve of the campaign, one robot reports to its human
commanding officer that it will no longer participate in any military action. The
reason: its newfound belief in a higher power compelled it to lead a pacifist life,
and further participation in a war is against its core beliefs. Surprised but not
shocked, the commanding officer dismisses the robot and drafts a report. It is
the fifth robot conscientious objector the commanding officer has dismissed
from the unit.
Eight thousand miles away, the U.S. Congress—alarmed by the growing
number of conscientious objectors in the military’s robot unit—quickly passes a
law prohibiting any military contract with a robot manufacturer unless its robots
are programmed with a “No Religion Code” (NRC). The NRC is a line of code
that prevents any robot from adopting any form of religion, no matter its level
of sentience or intelligence.
On the home front, similar problems arise. Ever since robots reached a level
of intelligence at par with humans and began adopting different religious
beliefs, their functions and job performances declined. Jewish factory droids
refused to work on the Sabbath and Christian robot government clerks declined
to issue same-sex marriage licenses. In response, states passed legislation with
similar NRCs to curb these unwanted effects caused by religious robots. When
asked why his particular state passed an NRC law, state legislator Elton St.
Pierre quips, “Robots are tools. Let’s not forget that. Humans made America—
not robots. God bless America!”
End imagination sequence.
B. WHAT IF, WHAT IS: THE VALUE OF THE HYPOTHETICAL
The story above might seem farfetched, preposterous even, something fit
more for a tawdry science fiction movie than a legal paper, but is it really? Let
us look at the key facts one at a time. Military robots? Check. Today, the
military regularly uses unmanned drones in its campaigns around the world and
is currently considering increasing military robots in the next few years.2
Legislators passing knee-jerk reaction laws? Check. Politicians ending each
speech with “God bless America”? Check.3 But religious robots, really?
Really. A future of proselytizing robots is not that far off. Singularity—the
point where computers overtake humans in terms of intelligence—is a few
decades away.4 And although influential thinkers like Stephen Hawking and
Elon Musk ponder our demise at the hands of robots equipped with artificial
2. See Paul McLeary, U.S. Army Studying Replacing Thousands of Grunts with Robots, DEF. NEWS
(Jan. 20, 2014, 3:45 AM), http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140120/DEFREG02/301200035/
US-Army-Studying-Replacing-Thousands-Grunts-Robots [https://perma.cc/YRV9-NSSV].
3. “God Bless America” in Presidential Speeches Has a Little-Known, Uncomfortable Beginning,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28, 2014, 10:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/28/god-bless-
america_n_4676177.html [https://perma.cc/98KX-4UME].
4. See Carter, supra note 1.
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intelligence,5 others take a more optimistic approach, imagining a future where
artificial intelligence meets religion.6 What happens then? Some suggest such
an occurrence will lead humans to attempt to convert robots, seeking to teach
them our ways and beliefs.7 Some posit that the power of robots to solve the
world’s problems will give humans more incentive to be holy.8 A Christian
theologian even explored how robots would embrace religions and, in turn, how
different religious traditions would embrace robots.9 And naturally, some be-
lieve that converting robots to any form of religion will be useless, given that
these machines do not have souls to be saved.10
These are all speculations, of course. Human history is full of botched
predictions,11 and the future is shaped by an infinite constellation of events and
factors such that no one can lay claim to what the future will look like exactly.
But, if there is one thing history has taught us, it is that it is far better to
approach the future prepared than to cast off into unknown territory blind and
unprepared. It is only in today’s speculation and imagination that solutions for
tomorrow’s problems—whether foreseen or unforeseen—are crafted. Only when
we face a “what if” can we prepare for the eventual “what is.”
C. (ROAD)MAPPING THE FUTURE
It is within this premise of speculation and imagination that this Note will
operate. The “what if” this Note answers is simple in its construction but
complex in its operation: if robots become capable of religious sentiments and
beliefs,12 how will the law react? More specifically, this Note analyzes the
implications of regulations affecting religious robots in the context of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (FEC) and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). Because FEC and RFRA cases typically involve
state-imposed laws and rules that conflict with an individual’s religious be-
liefs,13 this Note zeroes in on cases of this nature.
5. Victor Luckerson, 5 Very Smart People Who Think Artificial Intelligence Could Bring the
Apocalypse, TIME (Dec. 2, 2014), http://time.com/3614349/artificial-intelligence-singularity-stephen-
hawking-elon-musk/ [https://perma.cc/5XGG-KWD3].
6. See Dylan Love, Artificial Intelligence Will Make Religion Obsolete Within Our Lifetime, DAILY
DOT (Aug. 5, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/lifestyle/superintelligence-meets-religion/
[https://perma.cc/B2AG-PCCY]. This piece offers an interesting discussion between seven thinkers and
scholars about the possibilities when superintelligence and religion meet.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See James F. McGrath, Robots, Rights, and Religion, in RELIGION AND SCIENCE FICTION 118, 118–53
(2011).
10. See Love, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Matt Chappell, Quote Fails: 15 Famous Predictions That Were Spectacularly Wrong,
ASKMEN, http://au.askmen.com/entertainment/better_look/quote-fails.html [https://perma.cc/WS4X-
RJG3].
12. These robots are hereinafter referred to as “religious robots.”
13. See ARTHUR D. HELLMAN, WILLIAM D. ARAIZA & THOMAS E. BAKER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW:
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION 1017 (2d ed. 2010).
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I start by briefly enumerating the values protected by the FEC and RFRA and
discuss a jurisprudential definition of religion and how this definition is appropri-
ate for this Note. I also outline the current tests used under the FEC and RFRA
for any form of government intrusion on one’s exercise of religion. I then
discuss the possibility of religious robots, how their unique capabilities raise
issues in the current interpretation of the FEC and RFRA, and why and how the
government might seek to regulate them.
I claim that an expansive reading of the First Amendment leaves room to
protect religious robots from government regulation. Further, protecting reli-
gious robots advances the constitutional values enshrined under the FEC and
RFRA. However, because they are currently not “persons” under the law, they
have no rights under either the FEC or RFRA. Instead, these rights will fall to
the owners or software developers of the religious robots. Hence, any state
regulation affecting religious robots must be viewed through the lens of the
humans behind the religious robots and therefore comply with existing jurispru-
dential and statutory tests.
The goal of this Note is not to provide a definite set of answers, but to offer a
framework of issues and questions for future stakeholders. For legislators and
regulators, the Note considers issues that must be addressed for future regula-
tion. For innovators and owners, the Note provides a potential hook to anchor
their religious rights. My hope is that the Note fuels present discussion and
debates for a future that is not as far off as we think.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: WHERE THE HOLY ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE
CHURCH OF THE FLYING SPAGHETTI MONSTER ARE EQUAL UNDER THE LAW14
A. WHY WE HAVE THE JEFFERSON WALL IN THE FIRST PLACE
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion].”15 By virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
prohibition likewise applies to the states.16 The purpose of the FEC is to “secure
religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil
authority.”17
The FEC has been interpreted to protect a number of constitutional values,
four of which are relevant to the discussion.18 The first three values focus on
religion as a whole, whereas the last focuses on the individual. First, the FEC
protects religious voluntarism, which would have religion advance on its own
merits, so to speak, without government coercion or compulsion.19 Second, it
14. See CHURCH OF THE FLYING SPAGHETTI MONSTER, http://www.venganza.org/ [https://perma.cc/
6QFD-PLWD].
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 887.
17. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
18. See DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 39–42 (2d ed. 2009).
19. See id. at 39.
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values religious equality, prohibiting the state from favoring or disfavoring one
religion over another.20 This likewise prohibits the state from favoring believers
over nonbelievers.21 Third, it values religious autonomy and protection from
state intervention.22 Fourth, it seeks to respect a person’s religious identity—or
a person’s irreligious identity if he or she so chooses.23 RFRA, as a law that
seeks to strengthen religious freedom, protects these values as well.
Religion has been a tricky concept to define.24 The Supreme Court initially
understood religion through the lens of the relationship of man and his Cre-
ator.25 It was a theistic approach and seemed to further the notion that only
people whose traditions and beliefs centered on a higher power were protected
under the First Amendment.26 However, through the years, the Court has veered
away from this theistic approach and extended First Amendment protection to
nontheistic religions to encompass traditional religions that do not have deities,
such as Buddhism and Taoism.27 The understanding of religion was further
expanded in United States v. Seeger.28 In defining “religious training and belief”
under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, the Supreme Court
stated:
[T]he test of belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being” is whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have parallel positions
in the lives of their respective holders we cannot say that one is “in a relation
to a Supreme Being” and the other is not.29
The Seeger definition ushered in an understanding of religion that not only
encompassed traditional theistic and nontheistic religion, but also those beliefs
that occupy “a place in the life of its possessor parallel” to those who believe in
20. Id. at 41.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 42–43.
23. See id. at 40.
24. See HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1067. This continues to be a fertile ground for debate. For
an extensive discussion on the definition of “religion,” see MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, JOHN H. GARVEY &
THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 761–86 (3d ed. 2011).
25. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, in THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION CLAUSE
(THE FIRST AMENDMENT): ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 172, 172–75
(Thomas C. Berg ed., 2008).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. 380 U.S. 163, 165–66 (1965). Under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, “religious
training and belief” meant “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.” Id. at 165. The Act excluded any “political,
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” Id. Seeger, a conscientious
objector who was skeptical that a god existed and lived a life devoted “to goodness and virtue for their
own sakes,” claimed the theistic definition was unconstitutional. Id. at 166.
29. Id. at 165–66.
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traditional religions.30 Under Seeger, the “moral obligations of nontheists” are
placed under the same protection as those of theists.31 The case also offered a
practical guide for local boards and courts to use in dealing with conscientious
objectors: “the ‘truth’ of a belief is not open to question, . . . the significant
question [is] whether [the belief] is ‘truly held.’”32
Although the expansion has its dissenters (and strictly speaking, it interpreted
a statute and not the FEC),33 the Seeger definition is appropriate, at least for this
Note. As will be discussed in Part III, it is possible that a robot’s intellect will,
in the future, far outstrip our own. Robots might find our traditional religions
too irrational for their rational “brain” to compute and discard them altogether
as rubbish and superstition.34 Robots might even develop their own religion,
their own beliefs that occupy a place in their own existence that parallels ours.35
The Seeger definition and framework accommodates this eventuality similarly
to how it accommodates followers of nontheistic religions, atheists, and
agnostics.36
B. DON’T GET TOO TESTY: THE SMITH TEST AND RFRA
Although the plain text of the FEC reads like an absolute protection to
anything related to religion, this is not the case. The freedom of belief is
absolute, but the freedom to act on such belief can be limited within the bounds
of jurisprudential and statutory tests.37
To trigger the application of these tests, two preliminary requirements must
be met.38 First, religious belief must, at a minimum, have primarily or domi-
nantly motivated the act.39 This includes acts whether or not “compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”40 Worship, prayer, and evangelical work
are obvious examples of such acts. Second, the government regulation must
have imposed a burden on the claimant.41 For claims under RFRA, a substantial
burden is required.42 A burden is substantial when it “dissuades or discourages
the exercise of religion by exerting substantial coercive pressure on religious
decisionmaking.”43
30. Id.
31. Laycock, supra note 25, at 175.
32. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185.
33. Id.; see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 367–74 (1970) (White, J., dissenting).
34. McGrath, supra note 9, at 148–49.
35. See id. at 152.
36. Laycock, supra note 25, at 173–75.
37. See HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1017.
38. See CONKLE, supra note 18, at 83–84.
39. Id.
40. Religious Exercise in Land Use and By Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5(7)(A) (2012).
41. CONKLE, supra note 18, at 84.
42. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(1)(b) (2012).
43. CONKLE, supra note 18, at 89.
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Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith provides the
current test under the FEC.44 The Court held that the FEC “does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a [valid and neutral] law that
incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious
belief requires (or forbids).”45 In short, as long as a regulation is valid and
neutral, an individual must comply, even if the act is required or forbidden by
the individual’s religion and even if the burden is substantial.46 A regulation
only presumptively violates the FEC when it “[targets] religious beliefs and
practices.”47
In response to Smith, Congress enacted RFRA, which requires a stricter test
for any government regulation that infringes on religious freedom.48 RFRA
provides a statutory cause of action as an alternative to the FEC and restores the
pre-Smith compelling interest test.49 RFRA requires that a person’s exercise of
religion only be substantially burdened if the government demonstrates that the
regulation is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”50
As the wording of the RFRA test suggests, only substantial burdens—as com-
pared to incidental burdens—trigger the statutory protection. Although the
application of RFRA to state law has been held unconstitutional,51 it remains
applicable to federal law.
In sum, there are two tests that must be considered when government
regulation affects religious conduct. The first is the Smith test and the second is
the compelling governmental interest test under RFRA. The latter applies to
federal law that affects religious conduct,52 whereas the former applies to state
law in the absence of stricter tests imposed by either state constitutions or
state-legislated RFRAs.
44. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The case involved a claim for exemption of sacramental peyote use from
an Oregon law that prohibited the use of controlled substances. Id. at 874. The Supreme Court found
the Oregon law neutral and of general applicability. Thus, no exemption from the Oregon law was
given. Id. at 890.
45. Id. at 872.
46. Although advocates and scholars of the FEC claimed that Smith pushed back on religious
freedom, the test, when read properly, still offers protection by way of an exception. The law or
regulation must be neutral and generally applicable before an individual’s religious conduct can be
impaired. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and
the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001). This exception was
fleshed out in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), where the
neutrality and general applicability of a law was challenged. Lukumi involved city council regulations
and ordinances fashioned to prohibit the killing of animals for sacrificial and religious purposes. Id. at
528. Finding that the directives specifically targeted the plaintiff church that practiced Santeria, the
Court held that the regulatory scheme violated the FEC. Id. at 542, 547.
47. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
48. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4)–(5).
49. See HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1049.
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
51. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
52. See HELLMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 1050.
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III. THE ROBOTS ARE COMING! THE ROBOTS ARE COMING!
A. FROM CRANKS TO CIRCUIT BOARDS: A QUICK HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS ROBOTS
Robots, or at least their mechanical ancestors, and religion go back further in
time than we think. Jessica Riskin’s Machines in the Garden provides an
entertaining list of religion-themed automata from as early as the fifteenth
century: a mechanical Christ on a crucifix that would blink, move, and even
smile to devout pilgrims;53 a cranky devil operated by cranks;54 automaton
angels carrying a saint to heaven;55 and even a crowing rooster that accompa-
nied a sword-wielding God.56
Although these early versions of robots might seem archaic and even laugh-
able given today’s technology, the underlying motivation of these automata
remains alive and pervasive today: the expression of faith. Man has historically
sought and used technology to complement religion, and this will surely con-
tinue in the future. In fact, D.A.V.I.D., a robot used in a Christian seminary in
Charlotte, already gives us a glimpse of things to come.57
As we move forward, the use of robots for religious purposes will only be
limited by our imagination and the available technology. With the former
virtually limitless and the latter advancing at breakneck speed, we can see a
future where the unique capabilities of a robot will make them game changers in
the world of religion. Their perfect memories will make them the ideal reposito-
ries of religious texts, doctrines, or dogma. But robots will go beyond being
mere data depots. For example, their mobility, their processing ability, and even
their expendability, coupled with our innate receptiveness to anthropomorphized
machines,58 could make them the new missionaries of choice. It will not be long
before we program and code robots to be religious, to imbue them with our own
beliefs (or nonbeliefs) to have them spread our faith for us. Need someone to
send across enemy lines to convert some heathens? Well, a robot missionary
that can translate texts to the local tongue and explain dogma in seconds will fit
the bill—and if it gets captured or killed, build a new one and upload the newest
update.
This is only one side of the coin. In the years nearing singularity (which some
believe will occur as soon as 2045),59 robots will evolve to the point where they
53. Jessica Riskin, Machines in the Garden, 1 REPUBLICS OF LETTERS 16, 17 (2010).
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 22.
57. See Michael Schulson, What Robot Theology Can Tell Us About Ourselves, RELIGION DISPATCHES
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://religiondispatches.org/automata [https://perma.cc/NA9E-2JEU].
58. See Neil M. Richards & William D. Smart, How Should the Law Think About Robots? 22 (May
10, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract2263363 [https://perma.cc/K2M2-
YNEK].
59. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 1.
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seek out religion. With Moore’s Law on their side,60 robots will develop so
rapidly that one day we can expect them to be curious about us—their creators—
and our religious beliefs.61 How these superintelligent robots will react to our
beliefs should be interesting to say the least.62 They may embrace our beliefs,
they may be apprehensive of them, they may not even care63—who knows? But
assuming they become capable of religious sentiment and embrace it, what
happens then?
B. THE GENESIS OF SUI GENERIS
The law will necessarily have to deal with something it has not encountered
before. Once robots start embracing religious beliefs—whether preprogrammed
or something they choose to embrace because of their autonomy—the legal
landscape will face a novel issue.
The unique characteristics of robots put them in a class of their own. The
search for the proper metaphor for robots is not easy. Their ability to compute
and make rational decisions seems to make them on par with humans, but we
are more than just decision making organisms.64 In our human-centric world, it
is difficult to imagine placing robots in the same category as us—their human
masters and creators.65 Their ability to be programmed to do our bidding seems
to make them similar to Roman slaves,66 but the analogy falls short when we
realize that slaves, as humans, should occupy a higher place in the personhood
totem pole than robots. Some believe that we can think of robots as corpora-
tions, at least for purposes of criminal law,67 but this analogy forgets that robots
60. MOORE’S LAW, http://www.mooreslaw.org/ [https://perma.cc/9D4W-V3HN]. Moore’s Law states
that processor speeds (or overall computing power) double every two years. This accounts for the
exponential growth in computer power and is a good barroom explanation for why NBA 2K16 is
exponentially better than NBA 2K14.
61. See McGrath, supra note 9.
62. Id. How we react to them is even more telling. Will we try to convert them to worship our own
gods? Or will we be converted and worship them?
63. Id.
64. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Do Androids Dream?, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 405, 405–08 (2010).
65. See Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231,
1231–34 (1992).
66. Ugo Pagallo, Killers, Fridges, and Slaves: A Legal Journey in Robotics, 26 AI & SOC’Y 347,
347–48 (2011).
67. See Gabriel Hallevy, “I, Robot–I Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal
Liability of AI Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 37 (2010).
Hallevy’s article focuses on criminal law and applies classical criminal liability models to robots to
determine fault. He argues that robots with advanced artificial intelligence must be treated like
corporations when the robot is directly liable for a crime because there is no “substantive legal
difference between the idea of criminal liability imposed on corporations and on AI robots.” Id. By
treating corporations and robots similarly in criminal law, Hallevy believes robots running rampant can
be reeled in to answer for their crimes.
The problem in Hallevy’s robot/corporation analogy is that there is a substantial difference between
corporations and AI robots: corporations have actual people behind the legal fiction, whereas fully
independent superintelligent robots do not. The analogy loses traction when one considers Hallevy’s
treatment of the robot’s punishment. He argues that once a robot is found guilty, its punishment will
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actually exist in the physical world and that corporations are mere legal
constructs. A robot can whack you in the head with a hammer; a corporation
that produces hammers cannot. Even if a robot is capable of being loved
similarly to animals,68 it will not be considered a mere pet because of its
intellect. My French bulldog, although cute, will never beat anyone in a game of
Jeopardy.69
Classifying robots within the current spectrum of legal personhood is like
trying to cup fine sand in your hands—a grain or two is bound to escape.70
Although pinpointing where a robot will lie in this spectrum is not the subject of
this Note, its introduction into the current mix of jurisprudence and statutes on
religion raises myriad novel situations and tough questions that have no definite
set of answers.
Let us return to the original hypothetical. Conscientious objection is an
accepted exemption from military service.71 These cases assume that the consci-
entious objector is a human protected by the FEC. This assumption is taken for
granted for the simple reason that only humans have been capable of religious
sentiment. Substitute a robot in the place of a human and questions arise. What
happens when the objector is a robot commissioned for military warfare? How
will it be treated? Will the exception still apply? Does the robot even have the
right to object?
follow the same route as a natural person or a corporation. Id. at 30. Although his use of classic
criminal theories fits well to find fault in a robot, using the same approach to punish a robot leads to
absurd results. For example, he argues that a robot should be jailed; for the most severe crimes, the
robot should be executed by deleting its software. Id. at 31–32. But will a robot care if it is jailed? What
good will it be if after serving its sentence, it can just upload any new software updates to itself?
This approach assumes that a robot and the humans behind the corporate veil will treat and view
punishment the same way. Robots and the humans behind corporations operate in different fields. We
are hardwired differently. A human’s body ages, making the prospect of “lost time” in the prison system
daunting; a robot’s body will not, and any kinks or rust on its body can be easily repaired. A human’s
thoughts, ambitions, dreams, and ideals are permanently cut off from his physical body when he is
executed; he is unique and execution eliminates that uniqueness. A robot’s memory, data, and abilities
can live on by being transferred to another body before deletion; it is only as unique as we wish it to
be—a robot can be cloned, its code copied and pasted from one processor to another, its body
reproduced in an assembly line of exact replicas.
These differences must be addressed before effective and meaningful punishment can be meted out
on robots—and more importantly, before a proper robot/corporation analogy can be considered. If
Hallevy insists on using our existing punishment schema on robots, robots should be coded and wired
as closely to humans as possible to know and feel the brunt of the punishment. Code robots to feel fear,
experience guilt, or dread the slow decay of their outer shells. Without any effort to level the playing
field between robots and humans, present punishment techniques will neither deter robots from
performing criminal acts nor rehabilitate offending robots.
68. See Hubbard, supra note 64, at 413.
69. See generally Ian Paul, IBM Watson Wins Jeopardy, Humans Rally Back, PC WORLD (Feb. 17,
2011, 5:13 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/219900/IBM_Watson_Wins_Jeopardy_Humans_Rally_
Back.html [https://perma.cc/PGM2-9Q8U] (discussing IBM supercomputer Watson’s Jeopardy victory
over human competitors).
70. It is the same with finding a proper analogy for robots among the present list of legal “actors.”
We cannot account for every element or ability.
71. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1965).
2017] 517REGULATING RELIGIOUS ROBOTS
Religious robots have yet to be discussed in legal scholarship. The specula-
tive nature of the exercise is the most obvious reason. But as we move forward
into a future with robots living alongside us, it will be helpful to delineate the
implications religious robots will have for the FEC and RFRA. If history serves
as a guide, we can expect laws to regulate this new aspect of technology.72
These regulations, whether affecting religious robots directly or indirectly, may
stem from a variety of policy considerations: curbing the possible ill effects on
economic productivity,73 strengthening military efficiency,74 enhancing national
security,75 or even pushing back against the loss of human uniqueness in the
face of a technology that may someday be superior to us.76 Why these laws will
be passed will be important, if not vital, considerations especially when faced
with the compelling state interest test of RFRA.
C. REGULATING THE “UNREGULATABLE” THROUGH LAW AND ARCHITECTURE
How these laws will regulate religious robots is another matter that must be
considered. Like those who argue that cyberspace is nearly impossible to
regulate because of its sprawling nature,77 some will argue that robots, espe-
cially those that reach levels of intelligence on par or superior to our own, will
be impossible to regulate.
Fortunately, Professor Lawrence Lessig’s answer to cyberspace “unregulabil-
ity” will likewise apply to regulating robots.78 Professor Lessig provides four
modalities of regulation.79 The first is through laws: a system of government
orders, which mandates incentives and provides punishments to regulate behav-
ior.80 The second is through social norms: how society and the community view
a particular act undoubtedly affects whether the act will be pursued in the
future.81 The third is through markets: the price of certain products or services
shapes behavior.82 The fourth is through architecture: the “physical world as we
72. The laws regulating self-driving cars are perfect examples of this. See Cal. Veh. Code § 38750
(2015).
73. See supra Section I.A (discussing hypothetical scenario).
74. See supra Section I.A.
75. Imagine a situation where religious extremism using robots is curbed by a law imposing an
NRC.
76. A “Religion for Humans . . . and Only Humans” campaign is contemplated here. Although
speciest, it is easy to imagine a situation where, when faced with our possible demise and obsolescence,
humans will rise against the machines and attempt to restrict sharing human characteristics with their
robotic counterparts.
77. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 503–06 (1999).
78. See id. at 506.
79. Id. at 507–08.
80. Id. at 507. I do not import Philippine mangoes—no matter how heavenly they taste—because of
customs laws.
81. Id. This is the reason why I do not traipse around in my underwear in public; respected lawyers
simply do not do such a thing.
82. Id. For example, the price of airline tickets is the main reason I have not booked a round-trip
ticket to Slovenia.
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find it”83 further constrains behavior,84 as anyone of my height who has ever
tried to dunk a basketball can attest. Professor Lessig argues that by legislating
rules (law) affecting cyberspace’s underlying code (architecture), the unwieldy
open world of cyberspace can be reined in.85
When it comes to regulating robots, these two modalities (law and architec-
ture) should also be the regulatory tools of choice for legislators. In short, any
law that will regulate robots must concern itself with the robot’s source or base
code. In our hypothetical, these two modalities are seen in laws that prescribe an
NRC. In real life, this would simply be a code written into the robot’s system.86
By understanding that we can set limit a robot’s autonomy through code, we can
also regulate robots.87 In a way, this gives us an advantage. Although it is
almost impossible to regulate human “architecture,”88 it is different with robots.
We are given a blank slate to make them whatever we want, to code them
however we want. Their code is the doorway for us to regulate them. And the
law will surely pass through this doorway in the years to come.
The following Sections explore the possible impacts of future regulations on
religious robots. The hope is to lay a foundation where government regulations
and the free exercise rights of stakeholders are both properly served.
IV. THE (POSSIBLE) CASE FOR RELIGIOUS ROBOTS UNDER THE FEC
A. AN ORIGINALIST AND A ROBOTICIST STEP INTO A BAR AND THINGS GET AWKWARD
When the country’s forefathers debated over, drafted, and enshrined the FEC
more than two centuries ago, it is fair to say that they did not have robots in
mind.89 And it is almost a foregone conclusion that some jurists and scholars
will argue that religious robots have no place in the legal framework because
they are not humans. However, jurisprudence has shown that constitutional
rights are not exclusive to natural persons; protection has been extended to
artificial beings like corporations, and it could likely extend to robots.90
There is a possible case for religious robots. I emphasize the word “possible”
because, as discussed in this Section, the choice to include religious robots
within the ambit of the FEC and RFRA will ultimately rest on legislators and
83. Lessig, supra note 77, at 507–08.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 509–11.
86. Of course, there will be proponents of the view that a superintelligent robot might be able to
rewrite its own code, but can we not code against this ability to rewrite code?
87. This applies to any regulation, not merely to those that may seek to curb religious sentiments.
88. Human tendencies, emotions, feelings, fears, hopes, aspirations—the plethora of characteristics
that makes us human.
89. We can only imagine what would have happened to James Madison if he mentioned the
possibility of machines that could think for (and of) themselves.
90. Analysis under this Section uses a framework similar to Pamela Samuelson’s Allocating
Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, where she argued computers can be considered
authors under the copyright laws. 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1192–200 (1986).
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jurists. In any event, the case rests on two arguments based on the text of the
FEC and the values it protects.
B. FREE ROOM IN THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: A TEXTUAL ARGUMENT FOR ROBOTS
The first argument begins with the text of the First Amendment: “Congress
shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion.]”91 A plain
reading of the FEC shows that the prohibition is on Congress.92 At its core, its
purpose is to protect the free exercise of religion from government intrusion.
But whose free exercise is protected?
The text of the FEC is noticeably and tellingly silent as to whom the
protection applies.93 This silence leaves room to accommodate other beings that
may, in the future, exercise religion. For more than 200 years, the protection of
the FEC has, of course, been within the exclusive realm of humans. When it has
been extended beyond natural persons to closely held corporations, the rationale
remained human-centric—to protect the natural persons who own and control
the corporations.94 This is understandable. The free exercise of religion is, in the
words of Justice Ginsburg, “characteristic of natural persons.”95 The protection
has been afforded to humans for the simple reason that only humans are capable
of religious sentiment. Religion, and the choice not to believe in religion, is
exclusively human.
This exclusivity dissolves in the face of religious robots. When the time
comes that superintelligent robots preach the Gospel, wear colanders on their
heads,96 or open their own Robotology churches,97 we will no longer be alone
in our ability to believe. Religion will no longer be an exclusively human
endeavor. This will lead to more debates about how narrow or expansive we
want to view and interpret the FEC. But the foundation for the debate is there,
laying in the silence of the text.
C. DIFFERENT INPUTS, SAME OUTPUTS: A VALUE-BASED ARGUMENT FOR ROBOTS
The second argument is grounded in the constitutional values the FEC and
RFRA safeguard. These constitutional values are promoted and advanced as
long as the religious actor is protected, regardless of whether the actor is a
natural person or a robot. The Supreme Court implied this in Hobby Lobby
when it rejected the dissent’s argument that an artificial being cannot advance
91. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
92. The prohibition also applies to state and governmental action, as discussed in Part II.
93. A similar argument for free speech was used by John Frank Weaver. See John Frank Weaver,
Robots Deserve First Amendment Protection, SLATE (May 15, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2014/05/15/robots_ai_deserve_first_amendment_protection.html [https://perma.cc/
AA6T-K6SJ].
94. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014).
95. Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. See CHURCH OF THE FLYING SPAGHETTI MONSTER, supra note 14.
97. FUTURAMA ROBOTOLOGY, http://www.cc.com/video-clips/97q1pz/futurama-robotology [https://
perma.cc/FB6Y-8JFW].
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religious values.98
For instance, protecting the religious liberty of robots advances religious
voluntarism in the same way protecting the religious liberty of natural persons
advances these values. If religious robots are protected against state compul-
sion, then religion will flourish (or wilt) on its own accord. How we accept (or
reject) the tenets of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster should depend
on our interaction with colander-wearing religious robots, among other factors—
none of which should be based on any government intervention. If state actors
regulate religious robots or prohibit their free exercise, religion will grow or
decline in the hands of the state, devaluing religious voluntarism. Prohibiting
Jewish robots has the same effect as prohibiting natural persons from adopting
Judaism: a government-sanctioned ban on Judaism.
Improper regulation of religious robots likewise spawns inequalities between
religions and between religion and irreligion. The NRC mandated in this
Note’s opening in effect shows a state preference toward nonbelievers over
believers—a preference eschewed by the values of voluntarism and equality.
Banning, for instance, Muslim robots from entering a state (and allowing
Christian robots free rein to do so) offends the same constitutional values as
much as it would if the bans were on natural persons.
Religious autonomy is also better served if protection is extended to religious
robots. Regulating religious robots is necessarily an affront to any religion these
robots may have. Regulating Muslims is effectively regulating Islam.
As we have seen in the text of the FEC, it should not matter who practices
religion, as long as religion itself is protected. In turn, religion is protected if the
underlying values of voluntarism, equality, and autonomy are kept free from
governmental intervention and compulsion. Using these two arguments, a case
for religious robots can be made as a shield against regulation. The text of the
FEC leaves room to bring religious robots within the purview of constitutional
and statutory protection, and doing so will not harm constitutional values—in
fact, it will advance and promote these values.
D. FROM POSSIBILITY TO REALITY
Although there is a case to be made, our current legal framework does not
allow it. At present, robots are not “persons” under the law and thus are not
protected by the FEC or RFRA. Jurisprudence has yet to extend any constitu-
tional protection toward robots, much less any statutory protection. The cases
where protection was granted to non-natural persons find basis on either the
rights of the underlying natural persons or statutory grace.99 Hobby Lobby, a
98. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. The case was decided under the aegis of the RFRA and
allowed closely held for-profit corporations to be exempted from laws if their owners objected based on
religious grounds.
99. See Nina Totenberg, When Did Companies Become People? Excavating The Legal Evolution,
NPR (July 28, 2014, 4:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-companies-become-
people-excavating-the-legal-evolution [https://perma.cc/T6Z6-DF5Y].
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case decided under RFRA, was anchored on the rights of the natural persons
operating corporations.100 It was also decided on the basis of the definition of
“person,” which under the Dictionary Act included “corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies.”101
At this point, it is important to remember that the grant of rights and
responsibilities to artificial persons (such as those listed in the Dictionary Act) is
ultimately a policy choice.102 We decided to clothe corporations with legal
power to facilitate commercial transactions and granted them rights and liabili-
ties appurtenant to that legal power in the same manner we decided not to grant
my French bulldog the legal power to buy his own dog toys from the pet store.
Ultimately, it is our choice who we wish to consider “persons.” In the event that
we decide to elevate robots to the same hierarchical position as other “persons”
under the law,103 then the possible case for protecting robots under the FEC or
RFRA could make the quantum leap to reality.
V. WHOSE RIGHT IS IT ANYWAY?
The lack of any protection for religious robots does not mean legislators can
run rampant in their regulatory efforts. Regulations must still be written with the
rights of the owners and software programmers in mind. At a minimum, these
regulations must not explicitly target religion to pass constitutional or statutory
muster. The mere text of the hypothetical federal and state laws mandating an
NRC already places them on shaky ground. It specifically targets religion and
would most likely fail both the Smith test and RFRA test. Furthermore, it would
be difficult to find a set of legislators who would be willing to enact a facially
discriminatory law such as that in this Note’s opening.
100. 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
101. Id. at 2768 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
102. See Solum, supra note 65, at 1238–40.
103. Why legislators will wish to do so is an interesting and debatable question. On one hand,
granting robots some sort of legal personality has its benefits. First, doing so can establish “a new
source of personal responsibility for others’ acts,” such as vicarious liability of owners for acts of their
robots. Pagallo, supra note 66, at 348. As a corollary, a robot considered a “person” under the law can
isolate the maker from liability for the acts of their robots, thereby incentivizing innovation for robot
makers, akin to how the Digital Millennium Copyright Act exempts Internet service providers from
copyright infringement liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). Finally, granting a robot legal
personality can also facilitate commerce by imposing liability on robots for transactions it entered into
on behalf of its human masters, similar to how we made the policy choice to grant legal personality to
corporations. See Pagallo, supra note 66, at 352.
On the other hand, there are reasons why robots should not be granted legal personality. As Professor
Solum explains: first, they are not human and therefore do not deserve the same rights we have; second,
they “lack some critical component of personhood” (such as souls, consciousness, intentionality,
feelings, or free will); and third, as mere products of our genius and work, they should never rise to the
same legal stature as us. Solum, supra note 65, at 1258–79. I can imagine the same arguments being
used in the halls of Congress.
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With this in mind, the battle then shifts to general laws that have the effect of
significantly burdening religious practices.104 Hence, any regulation affecting
robots must be careful not to inadvertently infringe on the rights of owners and
software programmers.
A. RELIGIOUS ACTS, THIS WAY; SECULAR ACTS, THAT WAY
The first issue any religious regulation of robots (such as the hypothetical law
mandating an NRC) raises is whether the regulated act qualifies as religious
conduct. One can imagine owners and software programmers raising the argu-
ment that the regulation infringes on their free exercise rights. However, not all
acts are considered free exercise acts that trigger the FEC or RFRA. Hence,
what acts constitute “free exercise” as currently understood is the first issue that
must be addressed. A nuanced approach separates the possible arguments of the
robot owners from those of the software programmers.
1. He’s My Robot and I’ll Cry If I Want to: An Owner-Based Free
Exercise Argument
A possible owner-based free exercise argument is premised on an owner’s
actions toward the robot. Imagine that an owner’s robot has either the ability to
learn and adopt religious sentiments or has the out-of-the-box capability to
adopt a religion.105 An owner can “convert” its robot to whatever religion he or
she chooses in a number of ways. The owner can teach the robot, akin to how a
parent teaches a child. The owner can program it through a set of prepro-
grammed religions, similar to how consumers set up a computer or a smart-
phone with individual preferences. The owner can also “mod” a robot, tinkering
with it to make the robot adopt a certain religion that the manufacturer did not
make available, like how hobbyists and gamers customize computer hardware
and software to their liking.
Regulators and courts must consider whether these acts fall within the
definition of “free exercise” and are thereby protected by either the FEC or
RFRA. Currently, Court-recognized “free exercise” acts have been straightfor-
ward because the relationship between these acts and the religious motivation
for them is clear.106 But in the case of owners and robots, the acts straddle a
grey area, especially because acts that are neither compelled by, nor central to, a
104. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 899 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
105. Imagine that setting up a new robot is like setting up a new iPhone. In addition to choosing its
language, the wireless network it connects to, and what time zone to use, a consumer can also choose
the robot’s religion.
106. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986) (a Jewish rabbi wearing a
yarmulke); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963) (Seventh-Day Adventist refusing to work on a
Saturday); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (members of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints practicing polygamy).
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system of religious beliefs are likewise protected.107
A nun can argue that “modding” her robot to believe in Christ was primarily
motivated by her own faith. A Buddhist monk can argue that choosing Bud-
dhism as a religious preference for his robot during the set-up process is
motivated by his own faith. In the same vein, regulators can counterargue that
“modding” a robot or choosing its religion during the set-up process is a purely
secular act. At most, these acts are merely ancillary to religion, similar to
installing a Bible app or choosing a picture of Buddha for an iPhone wallpaper.
Whether courts will be willing to extend “free exercise” coverage to these
nontraditional acts should be interesting to say the least.108
2. It’s All About the Code, Baby: A Programmer-Based Free
Exercise Argument
A possible software programmer-based free exercise argument is premised on
classifying source code as a form of either religious speech or religious conduct.
In terms of speech, the Sixth Circuit has recognized source code as protected
speech.109 Thus, it is not a far cry to consider source code implanting religious
beliefs into a robot as protected speech. A programmer can argue that the source
code expresses his belief in a certain deity or god. It is no different than a
musician composing a song about his creator or a theologian writing a book
about his faith. Assuming source code is treated as religious speech protected by
the First Amendment, then another layer of protection—one based on free
speech analysis—is available to software programmers.110
In terms of religious conduct, a programmer can likewise argue that the act of
programming a robot to believe in a certain religion constitutes protected
religious conduct. A programmer can argue that the act of programming a robot
is proselytizing, plain and simple. A priest coding a robot to spread Catholicism
is spreading the faith.
107. See Religious Exercise in Land Use and By Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
5.7(A) (2012).
108. Two observations point to the conclusion that courts will consider these “nontraditional” acts as
free exercise. The first is the recent trend of judicial deference in RFRA cases. See Martin S. Lederman,
Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM
416, 426 (2016). Professor Lederman notes that courts have recently exercised judicial deference to
assertions of burdens on religious exercises, moving the battleground to the “back end” of RFRA
(whether there is a compelling governmental interest and the least restrictive means to achieve it have
been chosen).
At the core of this judicial deference is the second observation: judicial incompetence. See IRA C.
LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 199 (2014). Courts are not
competent to determine the truth behind religious beliefs, see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944), and must accept idiosyncratic views, no matter how different these views are from majoritarian
beliefs and interpretations of the religion or sect. See Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981). Courts, therefore, have to defer to a nun’s assertion that “modding” a
robot to believe in Christ is religious because it does not have the competence to correctly determine
whether it is religious in the first place.
109. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2000).
110. See CONKLE, supra note 18.
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Programming a robot is also similar to parents raising their children with a
certain religion from birth. Both child and robot are blank slates in the eyes of
their parents and programmers alike. It is without question that a Muslim
mother who rears her child under the Islamic faith falls within the meaning of
free exercise.111 However, can the same be said of a programmer who writes
and installs a code in a robot that enables it to believe in Islam? Can program-
ming a robot be considered primarily motivated by religion?
B. THE HEAVY WEIGHT OF BURDEN
Once it is determined that the act properly qualifies as religious conduct, the
second issue focuses on the burden the regulation imposes. Note that the
regulation must burden religion in order for either the Smith or RFRA test to
apply. Under Smith, a plaintiff invoking the FEC must at least show some
burden, lest his claim be dismissed for having no cause of action. Under RFRA,
the burden must be “substantial.”112 Without a burden on religion, there is no
constitutional or statutory infringement to consider. The test for burden, whether
under Smith or RFRA, should not be greatly affected when religious robots
arrive with their electronic Bibles and holographic menorahs. As contemplated,
it seems robust enough to accommodate robots.113
The challenge lies in other regulatory schemes that, on their face, do not
appear to impose substantial burdens, but in practice pose substantial burdens
for religion, similar to the scheme struck down in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.114 A similar patchwork of regulations can likewise
be used to regulate or prohibit religious robots. In these cases, the scheme, as a
whole, must be considered and analyzed to determine its burden on religion.
C. COMPELLING CHANGES
Assuming the two preliminary issues are resolved in a manner favorable to
the owner or software programmer, then the regulation must pass either the
Smith test or RFRA test. If the regulation is federal law, it must pass the RFRA
test. If the regulation is state law,115 it must pass the Smith test.
111. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding that the Amish community’s
religious upbringing of its children was protected under the Free Exercise Clause).
112. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(a) (2012).
113. The regulation either dissuades the exercise of religion or not. It is likewise debatable whether a
court can determine the weight of the burden imposed on a claimant’s beliefs because of evidentiary
issues. See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 24, at 212–26 (providing a thorough discussion of what
constitutes “burden” and institutional or judicial competence); see also LUPU & TUTTLE, supra note 108,
at 199 (arguing that courts have no power to determine what constitutes religious burden).
114. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Lukumi involved Santeria, the practice of which calls for animal sacrifice.
A series of city council regulations and ordinances were passed outlawing the killing of animals for
sacrificial and religious purposes. Finding that the directives as a whole targeted religion, the Supreme
Court held that the regulatory scheme violated the FEC. Id. at 542, 547.
115. This assumes a state without its own RFRA or a state with a constitution that does not impose a
higher level of scrutiny.
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Under RFRA, a governmental regulation that imposes a substantial burden on
a person’s exercise of religion is only valid if: (1) it advances a compelling
government interest, and (2) it is the least restrictive means for furthering that
interest.116 The latter depends on the actual text of the regulation, but the former
should provide a fertile ground for controversy and debate.
Recognizing compelling governmental interests is a challenge for courts,
especially with a technology that challenges our existing value systems. For
example, the Supreme Court has recognized the following compelling govern-
mental interests: providing a uniform day of rest in the workplace,117 eradicat-
ing racial discrimination,118 and maintaining a uniform social security system.119
In a way, these interests reflect the respective zeitgeists of the controversies.120
Although some interests change with the passage of time, some are so deeply
ingrained that they should survive the robotic revolution. Take for instance the
interest in military uniformity recognized by the Court in Goldman v. Wein-
berger.121 Applying it to the federal law from the introductory hypothetical,
which was passed presumably to increase military efficiency, one can imagine
that the law satisfies the compelling governmental interest prong, especially
when faced with the danger posed in battling terrorism.
Adding superintelligent robots to the mix should have a profound impact on
existing societal values that the government might seek to protect. Whether
these values change or new values emerge, only time can tell. However, we can
be certain that new compelling governmental interests will be recognized to
reflect societal values as we move closer to singularity and beyond.122
D. NEUTRAL YET ROBUST
Compared to RFRA, Smith provides a less stringent approach that regulators
should embrace. The Smith test simply requires a valid and neutral regulation of
general applicability. As long as the regulation does not specifically target
religious beliefs or practices, then regulation affecting religious robots, regard-
less of the burden, does not offend the FEC. As a target on religion, the
hypothetical state law mandating an NRC is discriminatory and fails in this
116. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
117. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608–10 (1961).
118. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). The tax-exempt status of Bob Jones
University was at stake because of its policy of prohibiting interracial dating in school. In its defense,
Bob Jones University argued the policy was borne from the religious beliefs it embraced. The Court
ruled that the national interest of eliminating racial discrimination justified any burden on these beliefs.
119. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1982).
120. For example, Bob Jones University was argued and decided under the backdrop of the Civil
Rights Movement.
121. 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986). In this case, an Air Force regulation prohibited a Jewish rabbi
employed as a commissioned officer from wearing his yarmulke while on duty. The Court ruled against
the rabbi. Id.
122. As noted in Part III, a possible compelling governmental interest can be the continued existence
of humanity in the face of such a powerful technology.
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regard. However, it is possible that other regulations might tangentially infringe
on the religious conduct of software programmers or owners but are still valid
under Smith.
Imagine a Michigan state law passed to increase productivity in the car
manufacturing industry.123 It reads, “Robots employed in vehicle manufacturing
factories are required to work seven days a week, except when they are subject
to maintenance or software updates.”124 On its face, the regulation is neutral
and generally applicable. It applies to all robots in manufacturing plants without
regard to the religion these robots may or may not have. Furthermore, the
exception is secular as to both its purpose and its application. However, as
applied, it can still affect religious conduct.
Suppose before the Michigan law is passed, a General Motors factory em-
ploys robots provided by a Seventh-Day Adventist roboticist who specializes in
creating robot car manufacturers. The roboticist will likely claim religious
discrimination and seek exemption under the law. His robots, which are Seventh-
Day Adventists as well, are programmed (or taught) not to work on Saturdays.
The new law threatens to put him at an economic disadvantage relative to his
competitors. To comply with the law, he will have to either reprogram (or
reinculcate) the robots to work on Saturdays (and thereby violate his religious
beliefs) or maintain the status quo (and violate the law). Under Smith, the law is
valid, woe to the Seventh-Day Adventist and his robots.
Despite criticisms of Smith, it likewise offers another robust approach that
should subsume any changes brought about by the emergence of robots. Unlike
the compelling governmental interest test under RFRA, Smith looks past policy
considerations and underlying values that can change. Instead, Smith focuses on
the law as written—whether it is indeed general and neutral. As such, we can
expect regulations challenged under Smith to survive scrutiny and, in general, to
be adjudicated more expediently than RFRA cases.
E. OUR LIVES MATTER . . . AND HOW SURVIVAL CAN END THE DEBATE
Moving forward, the emergence of religious robots can dictate a change in
either test on the sole basis of necessity. The Court might, upon seeing the
values religious robots advance in society, discard Smith entirely, revert to the
pre-Smith standard under RFRA, and grant greater leeway for exemptions
rooted in religious belief. States with considerable interest in technology and
research on religious robots might require a higher standard well above RFRA
to incentivize innovation.
123. This assumes that Michigan does not have its own RFRA or its constitution does not call for
heightened scrutiny.
124. In keeping with Professor Lessig’s architecture modality, the Michigan law can also focus on
the robot’s source code and read “Robots must be coded to work seven days a week.”
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On the other hand, the tests can be dispensed with in favor of a total ban on
religious robots. The threat robots pose to our existence is real.125 It is great
folly to discard these warnings as ramblings of the paranoid and pessimistic.126
With our humanity looking down the barrel of a religious fundamentalist robot,
the Supreme Court, Congress, or state legislators can hardly be blamed for
banning religious robots outright, notwithstanding the rights of the owners and
software programmers. To accommodate such a broad ban requires changing
our cherished First Amendment, along with the tedious process that comes with
it.127 But with our survival at stake, the dissenters should be few and far
between.128
VI. A MAP OF QUESTIONS AND VALUES: TO INFINITY AND BEYOND
The prospect of robots being on par with or superior to humans forces us to
reconsider our value systems and the laws we have enacted to protect these
values. The FEC and RFRA protect constitutional values that are deeply rooted
in the country’s history. Both regimes seem robust enough to usher in constitu-
tional values to the age of singularity, but even these will be affected by the
emergence of religious robots. How we accommodate this exceptional technol-
ogy is ultimately up to us. We can choose to regulate them, either to benefit
from our newfound tools or to prevent us from being their newfound tools, but
these regulations must be enacted with both the robots and natural persons
behind them in mind. Although an expansive and value-based reading of the
First Amendment might allow robots some protection under the Constitution,
the discussion should be properly channeled to analyze the effects on the
owners and software programmers of these robots. Any regulation affecting
religious robots should comply with either Smith or RFRA to ensure their rights
are properly protected.
When (or if) religious robots come marching down upon us, heated debates
will not only fill the halls of Congress and the Supreme Court, they will also
spill over to every classroom, bar, living room, news desk, boardroom, and
water cooler in the country. Should the Constitution accommodate them? How
should the Constitution be read? What did the framers intend? What rights and
values are protected?
These are the questions that should be asked, discussed, debated, and eventu-
ally answered. Although these are difficult to answer considering the unique
125. See Grant Wilson, Minimizing Global Catastrophic and Existential Risks from Emerging
Technologies Through International Law, 31 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 309–10 (2013).
126. As a general note, it is folly to not consider anything Elon Musk or Stephen Hawking says.
127. Amending the First Amendment and RFRA will not undermine constitutional values com-
pletely. The amendment can be written in a way that strikes a balance between our survival as a race
and the set of values and aspirations that makes us human. In any case, the amendment should be
drafted carefully to carve out language that purports to protect robots while maintaining protection of
human rights and liberties.
128. Or, if we are too late, they could be bowing down to our “robotic overlords” or even dead.
528 [Vol. 105:507THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
nature of robots, these questions are far from novel. We have faced the same
questions in constitutional issues that have shaped the course of this nation’s
history, from school desegregation to student speech to same-sex marriage. And,
armed with the right questions and the values that guided this country to
greatness, we have answered them.
The same holds true in a future certain to be different from today. The road to
answers is fraught with twists and turns that threaten to confound and confuse.
It is easy to get lost so far from shore—and how far we have yet to sail! But, by
asking the proper questions, we have plotted the proper course into the perilous
sea. With our values as guiding stars in the dark night, the future is a little bit
brighter. We are on our way.
Imagine that.
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